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The Internet of Things (IoT) is increasingly used for crit-
ical applications and securing the IoT has become a ma-
jor concern. Among other issues it is important to ensure
that tampering with IoT devices is detected. Many IoT
devices use WiFi for communication and Channel State In-
formation (CSI) based tamper detection is a valid option.
Each 802.11n WiFi frame contains a preamble which allows
a receiver to estimate the impact of the wireless channel,
the transmitter and the receiver on the signal. The estima-
tion result - the CSI - is used by a receiver to extract the
transmitted information. However, as the CSI depends on
the communication environment and the transmitter hard-
ware, it can be used as well for security purposes. If an
attacker tampers with a transmitter it will have an e↵ect
on the CSI measured at a receiver. Unfortunately not only
tamper events lead to CSI fluctuations; movement of people
in the communication environment has an impact too. We
propose to analyse CSI values of a transmission simultane-
ously at multiple receivers to improve distinction of tamper
and movement events. A moving person is expected to have
an impact on some but not all communication links between
transmitter and the receivers. A tamper event impacts on
all links between transmitter and the receivers. The paper
describes the necessary algorithms for the proposed tam-
per detection method. In particular we analyse the tamper
detection capability in practical deployments with varying
intensity of people movement. In our experiments the pro-
posed system deployed in a busy o ce environment was ca-
pable to detect 53% of tamper events (TPR = 53%) while
creating zero false alarms (FPR = 0%).
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1. INTRODUCTION
A large number of IoT systems are using WiFi as a means
of communication [2]. Many of these systems require a high
level of security. An example is a surveillance system using
WiFi based cameras integrated with antennas to monitor
critical infrastructures such as an airport or power plant.
Traditional cryptographic operations can be used to authen-
ticate data transmitted from the camera devices. However,
tampering with a device (e.g. movement or change of view-
point) cannot be detected using cryptographic methods. Us-
ing CSI analysis of transmitted data from camera devices
would allow us to introduce an additional layer of defence
which can detect these tamper events. CSI based tamper de-
tection is a valuable security building block for critical sys-
tems using wireless communication. In addition, CSI values
can be extracted from existing transmissions and the over-
head for implementing CSI based tamper detection is low.
Each 802.11n WiFi frame contains a preamble which al-
lows a receiver to estimate the impact of the wireless chan-
nel and of the transmitter on the received signal. Amplitude
changes and phase shifts of several subcarriers used to trans-
mit the signal are estimated at the receiver using the pream-
ble information. The resulting CSI is used by a receiver to
extract successfully the transmitted information. However,
as the CSI depends on the communication environment and
the transmitter hardware, it can also be used for security
purposes. If an attacker tampers with a transmitter, either
by replacing the device or by moving it, it will have an e↵ect
on the CSI measured at a receiver.
Unfortunately, not only tamper events lead to CSI fluc-
tuations, modifications of the communication environment
have an impact too. In particular, movement of people in the
communication environment has a noticeable influence on
the CSI. In our previous work [1] we have been shown that
tamper detection based on CSI analysis is generally possible
but that it is hard to distinguish tamper events from natural
changes in the communication environment. Thus, it is dif-
ficult to construct a practical security system based on CSI
analysis as a high number of false positives and a low num-
ber of true positives are detected. Figure 1 illustrates this
challenge. The changing CSI amplitude value over time for
just one subcarrier is shown. As can be seen, tamper events
and environmental changes (in this case a person walking
between sender and receiver) manifest in very similar ways.

















Figure 1: E↵ects of environmental changes and tam-
pering on CSI amplitude values of the 9th subcarrier
of the 2nd antenna. Environmental changes and tam-
per events have a similar e↵ect on CSI amplitude
values.
To address this problem we propose to analyse CSI val-
ues from a single transmission simultaneously at multiple
receivers to improve distinction of tamper and movement
events. A moving person is expected to have an impact
on some but not all communication links while a tamper
event is noticeable at all receivers. In this paper we describe
the necessary algorithms for the proposed CSI tamper de-
tection method using multiple receivers. In particular we
analyse the tamper detection capability in practical deploy-
ments with varying intensity of people movement. Specific
contributions of this paper are:
• Multi-Receiver CSI Tamper Detection: We describe
CSI algorithms for tamper detection using multiple re-
ceivers.
• Tamper Detection Evaluation: We analyse the tam-
per detection capability of the proposed method us-
ing realistic deployment environments. We describe
system capability in these environments in terms of
achievable False Positive Rate (FPR) and True Posi-
tive Rate (TPR).
• Tamper Detection Implementation: We describe how
the proposed algorithms can be put to action in prac-
tical deployments. We discuss their application in the
future IoT.
In our experiments the proposed system deployed in a
busy o ce environment was capable to detect 53% of tam-
per events (TPR = 53%) while creating zero false alarms
(FPR = 0%).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the threat model. Section 3 discusses related work.
Section 4 describes the algorithms used for multi-receiver
CSI tamper detection. In Section 5.1 the system capabil-
ity is analysed in a controlled environment where people
move within the setup in a known and controlled way. In
Section 5.2 the system capability is analysed in an uncon-
trolled, more challenging environment. An o ce setup is
used in which people move freely throughout the day; dur-
ing daytime a lot of movement is present while at night the
environment is more quiet and less movement occurs. In Sec-
tion 6 we discuss how the proposed mechanisms can be put
to work within real IoT applications. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. THREAT MODEL
In this paper we are considering an attacker who is capa-
ble of physically tampering with a device. We assume that
the attacker is able to move or rotate the device. Our aim
is to detect such device movements with a high detection
reliability and a low false alarm rate.
In this work we do not consider physical tampering with
internal components of the device. We do not aim to de-
tect replacement of device components such as the micro-
controller. Additionally, we do not assume the attacker
is able to change the software running on the device. To
protect against internal device tampering other protection
methods than the one discussed in this paper have to be
used.
An example application scenario for which the tamper de-
tection method described in this paper is useful is a wireless
surveillance system where WiFi enabled cameras integrated
with antennas are deployed to monitor an area. An attacker
would aim to prevent observation of a particular section (i.e.
to pass undetected through the observed area). This can be
achieved by moving the device to alter the camera’s view.
This kind of attack cannot be detected by using conven-
tional security protocols. Our proposed system aims to de-
tect these tampering attacks. Obviously a low false positive
rate is necessary for such a system as any alarm would re-
quire unnecessary investigation of the camera system. On
the other hand, high true positive rates are desirable to en-
sure reliable tampering detection.
3. RELATEDWORK
PHY-layer information has been used to secure wireless
networks in many ways. The application areas that are re-
lated to our work are transmitter location distinction and
transmitter identification, which can ultimately be used for
transmitter tamper detection.
Transmitter location distinction aims to determine trans-
mitter location changes by using the received signal char-
acteristics. Channel Frequency Response (CFR) [11] and
Channel Impulse Response (CIR) [13,17] are used in Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) modulated networks,
and recently CSI [1] is used in Orthogonal Frequency Di-
vision Multiplexing (OFDM) modulated networks. DSSS
modulation is of no importance for WiFi systems any more,
and 802.11n fully adapts OFDM modulation. The work by
Bagci et al. [1] is the closest to ours in terms of source of
PHY-layer information, encoding methods and test devices.
The work shows that transmitter location distinction based
on CSI is possible for OFDM networks in static deployment
environments. Their work also shows that natural changes in
the communication environment make it hard to distinguish
actual location changes and that these changes cause false
alarms. In practical deployments, natural changes in the
communication environment are unavoidable. We propose
to use multiple receivers to improve the location distinction
for CSI based detection systems in practical deployments.
Transmitter identification uses received signal character-
istics to identify the transmitter device or the class of the
device. Modulation errors caused by modulator circuitry
are used in [3] to identify 802.11 devices. Ureten et al. [15]
and Danev et al. [4] use the transient part of the RF signal
to identify 802.11 and 802.15.4 devices, respectively. RFID
transponders are identified by using RF burst information
in [5]. WiFi stations are identified by using the angle-of-
arrival information of incoming signals in [16]. Most re-
cently, CSI is used to identify 802.11n devices in [1]. More
comprehensive information about transmitter identification
based on PHY-layer information can be found in [6].
Another usage of PHY-layer information in security is de-
tecting spoofing attacks. A source-authentication method
to detect spoofing attacks on 802.11n management frames
(MFs) by using CSI is proposed by Jiang et al. [10]. The
work uses CSI for the source of information as we do in our
work, however it is not aimed at tamper detection. They
show that amplitude of CSI changes in injected frames. Re-
ceived Signal Strength (RSS) information is also used to
detect spoofing attacks in [7]. Here, RSS is used to create
signalprints to detect identity-based attacks.
In summary, our work di↵ers from the existing work in
three ways: (i) In contrast to existing work, we analyze
multiple and more complex tampering scenarios. (ii) Most
other tamper detection systems are not designed for 802.11n
OFDM. (iii) Existing tamper detection systems do not work
in practical deployments as they do not address properly the
separation of environmental and tamper events.
4. CSI TAMPER DETECTION
As thoroughly described in [9], CSI information in 802.11n
systems is extracted from the HT-LTF preamble that con-
sists of training symbols on each OFDM subcarrier. These
symbols are known by both the transmitters and the re-
ceivers. The received preamble di↵ers from the transmitted
one due to the e↵ects of the wireless channels and the pre-
filtering at the transmitter, as well as, the e↵ects of the
transmitter’s and receivers’ hardware. To extract the trans-
mitted data streams at the receiver, the previously described
e↵ects on the preamble need to be inversely applied to the
data parts of the wireless frames, as each subcarrier in an
OFDM system can be represented as a linear combination
of the described e↵ects. Similar to previous work [1], we use
the CSI information that is extracted on every frame recep-
tion as tamper evidence. The main challenge of our work is
to cope with tamper unrelated events such as moving people
that change the wireless channel which influences the CSI.
In an optimal case, our system should detect all tamper-
ing events without being disturbed by other environmental
changes.
4.1 Beamforming and Spatial Expansion
As mentioned above, the data transmission on each sub-
carrier sc can be described by a linear system. According
to [1], we use T sc1 . . . T
sc
T to describe the signals sent by the
transmitter’s antennas on each subcarrier and Rsc1 . . . R
sc
R
as the corresponding received signals. Together with the
channel coe cient matrix HscR⇥T containing the CSI values
between each pair of transmit and receive antennas, the fol-
lowing linear system can be formulated:
Rsc = HscR⇥TT
sc
Instead of directly transmitting one data stream per an-
tenna, the transmitter can decide to use transmit filters to
either cancel channel e↵ects (beamforming) or to distribute
a lower number of data streams to a higher number of anten-
nas (spatial expanding). To perform the filtering operation,
the transmitter uses filtering matrices FscT⇥S to distribute S
spatial streams to T transmit antennas:
Tsc = FscT⇥SS
sc
To extract the data streams Ssc, the receivers need to





To simplify the receiver, the preamble to estimate the CSI
is also passed through the filter FscT⇥S , so that the receiver
always estimates MscR⇥S .
If the transmitter sends the packets in broadcast mode
(i.e., receiver agnostic) it only uses one spatial stream. In
this work, we assume this mode of operation; nodes trans-
mit periodic broadcast beacons which can be picked up by
multiple receivers for CSI based tamper detection.
4.2 Basic Tamper Detection
As transmitters send their packets in broadcast mode only
one spatial stream is used (S = 1). Therefore, we simplify
the representation of the CSI matrices and use MscR in the
remainder of the paper.
In the tamper detection algorithm, receivers collect and
store ⌧ CSI measurements MscR,i21...⌧ . These CSI measure-
ments are collected while the transmitter is in a tamper free
state and will be used for comparison with newly received
CSI measurements MscR,i>⌧ . A distance metric is used as
existing works show that such algorithms work well in this
context (see related work [1, 13, 17] as discussed in the pre-
vious section). If the distance is above a certain threshold,
the algorithm decides there is a tamper event and triggers
an alarm.
We consider three distance algorthims: (i) Euclidean dis-
tance, (ii) Mahalanobis distance and (iii) Earth Mover’s dis-
tance. The Euclidean distance gives the distance between
two points; in our case the distance of two CSI vectors. Ma-
halonobis distance gives the distance between a point and a
distribution, in our case the distance of a new CSI vector and
a distribution of ⌧ CSI vectors. And lastly, Earth Mover’s
distance gives the distance between two distributions, in our
case the distance of the distribution of two CSI vectors.
The algorithm uses only the amplitude information of a
CSI measurement and omits the phase information. The
amplitude information is normalized by taking the Euclidean
norm of all values in dimensions sc and r. Euclidean distance
Di is obtained by calculating the Euclidean distance between


















Similarly, we omit the phase information in MscR,i and use
normalized amplitude information when computing Maha-
lanobis and Earth Mover’s distance. We omit the details of
Mahalanobis and Earth Mover’s distance algorithms here as
they are well documented in the literature [12,14]. We show
in the evaluation Section 5.1 that the simplest distance com-
putation method (Euclidean distance) is su cient and that
the more sophisticated methods of Mahalanobis and Earth
Mover do not provide significantly better results.
To decide if tampering occurred, we need to set a thresh-
old  . If Di is greater than   the algorithm will detect tam-




0 if Di <  
1 if Di    
4.3 Multi-Receiver Tamper Detection
When using one link (one receiver) to evaluate tamper-
ing it is not possible to distinguish tamper situations and
environmental changes. Both events can push the distance
value above the threshold. We will demonstrate this e↵ect
in Section 5.1. To overcome this limitation we aim to use
multiple receivers for CSI analysis. The assumption is that a
tamper event will push the distance observed at all receivers
above the set threshold while a change in the environment
will not result in a su ciently significant distance change at
all receivers. We decided against an approach where a ma-
jority vote is used (i.e. the distance is above the threshold at
the majority of receivers to declare tampering). Tampering
with the transmitter device clearly must influence all links
and not just some.
Formally the overall tampering decision Qi with qni being












Where N is the number of receivers. Here, the packet i must
be received by all the receivers for a decision to be made.
This situation can occur in practice as the transmitted bea-
con used for tamper detection may not be received at all
stations.
4.4 Threshold Selection
The performance of the tamper detection largely depends
on the selected threshold  . If the threshold is selected too
high some tamper events might be missed. If the threshold
is too low the system is too sensitive and a large number
of false detections may occur. In this work we consider 3
methods for threshold selection: (i) Maximum Distance, (ii)
Equal Error Rate and (iii) Zero False Negative.
A simple and straightforward approach is to use the maxi-
mum distance of all captured CSIs during the training phase


















This threshold works well when the environment is static as
we will show. However, the algorithm doesn’t provide good
performance in terms of false alarms when the environment
is dynamic.
We use False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate
(FNR) and True Positive Rate (TPR) metrics to assess the
detection mechanism. False Positive (FP) occurs when the
algorithm falsely decides there is tampering but actually
there is not, False Negative (FN) occurs when the algo-
rithm misses a true tampering, and True Positive (TP) oc-
curs when the algorithm catches a tamper situation. We can
create a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve by
evaluating all possible thresholds. A ROC curve displays
the trade-o↵ between FPR and TPR for a given system. A
balanced threshold can be found for a system by looking at
the Equal Error Rate (EER). EER is the point where FPR
equals FNR on the ROC curve.
CSI data collected during a training phase can be used to
calculate a ROC. The threshold that gives the EER on the
ROC curve,  EER, can be used as a threshold. This thresh-
old gives a balanced result in terms of FPRs and TPRs.
However, as we will show in Section 5.2.2,  EER is often
too high. It gives very good FPR results, but at the same
time it causes very low TPRs. We thus need to decrease the
threshold, and to this end we propose to pick the maximum
threshold where the ROC curve gives FNR = 0,  FNR=0.
We will show in Section 5.2.2 that this threshold gives fair
TPRs and, unfortunately, provides FPR > 0. We propose
to apply time-wise filtering to the overall decision to address
this issue which we detail next.
4.5 Time-Wise Filtering
We apply a time-wise moving average filter to the overall
decision Qi to reduce the FPRs. We consider the points
ti—when a packet i was received by all the receivers—and
make a decision over a window tw. The overall time-wise
filtered decisionQi,tw is considered tampered if all individual













Note that although time-wise filtering helps to reduce the
FPRs, it will also reduce the TPRs. This is a trade-o↵ that
needs to be considered. Also, before a decision can be made,
data points covering a full window must be collected. This
increases the time until a decision can be made (tamper
detection is delayed).
5. EVALUATION
We start our evaluation with a controlled movement ex-
periment. In this experiment only one person is present and
movement of the person in the deployment area is known.
This experiment is used to analyse how distance values ex-
tracted from the CSI are a↵ected by movement. Further-
more, the experiment shows that the use of multiple re-
ceivers is an e↵ective measure for distinguishing movement
and tamper events.
Thereafter an experiment with uncontrolled movement is
carried out. Nodes are deployed in an o ce environment in
which o ce workers move around during the day. At night
there is less activity but occasionally people are present. In
this experiment we do not record the number of people or
their movements. The purpose of this experiment is to see
how di↵erent configurations of the tamper detection algo-
rithm handle realistic environments with di↵erent levels of
activity. We use this experiment as well to evaluate several
di↵erent tamper situations to see how likely di↵erent tamper
Figure 2: A laptop and an antenna used in the ex-
periments. Only the antenna is tampered (moved
or rotated) during the experiments.







R2 R1 R3 R4T
Room 1Room 2
Figure 3: Controlled movement experiment layout.
Receivers are shown as R1-4, and transmitter is
shown as T. The environment is static during the
experiment. A person is walking occasionally or
waiting in Room 1 or Room 2.
situations are to be detected.
We use o↵-the-shelf Toshiba NB250-108 laptops equipped
with an Intel 5300 network interface card (NIC) for our ex-
periments. The laptops run Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with the 3.5.7
kernel. We use the Linux 802.11n CSI Tool [8] to extract
CSI from the Intel 5300 NICs. Each NIC is equipped with a
triple TP-Link TL-ANT2403N 802.11n omni-directional an-
tenna. Figure 2 shows one of the laptops with antenna. To
induce tampering the antenna is moved or rotated.
5.1 Controlled Movement
We use 4 receivers and one transmitter deployed in an of-
fice building as shown in Figure 3. The transmitter sends
broadcast beacons at the rate of 1 packet/second. All re-
ceivers listen for these packets and extract the CSI from
incoming packets.
A history size of ⌧ = 100 CSI readings is required before
receivers calculate distance values. Figure 4 shows as an ex-
ample how the CSI amplitude values develop over time. Val-
ues as received by the 2nd antenna of Receiver 3 are shown;
similar data is available for the other 2 antennas. The x-
axis shows the time in minutes, and the y-axis shows the
amplitude at each OFDM subcarrier. It can be seen that
amplitude values change occasionally due to movement of a
person until tampering happens at time t = 21.5min which
is clearly visible. We detail movement patterns and tamper-
ing events in the next paragraphs.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the distance value development
over time at all 4 receivers using Euclidean, Mahalanobis,
and Earth Mover’s distance algorithms. We show the Max-
imum Distance threshold max(D⌧ ) in the figures. Figure 8
shows the resulting tamper detection decision qi considering
each receiver individually when using the Euclidean distance



















Figure 4: CSI amplitude values of 2nd antenna of
Receiver 3 during the controlled movement experi-
ment. Amplitude values change occasionally due to
movement until a tamper event at time t = 21.5min.
















































































Figure 5: Euclidean distance in the controlled move-
ment experiment. Tampering is induced at t =
21.5min. Distance values at each receiver increase
occasionally until this time due to movement.
Mover as these are very similar). The overall tamper de-
cision Qi considering all 4 receivers combined is shown in
Figure 9 for Euclidean, Mahalanobis, and Earth Mover’s
distance algorithms. The tamper event at t = 21.5min is
clearly identified; movement events before this time do not
lead to a tampering report.
All the receivers start to report distance values after 100
seconds. At the beginning of the experiment, a person is
waiting in Room 1.
At time t = 3.5min, the person walks close to Receiver 4,
waits next to Receiver 4 for a minute, and then enters
Room 1. We can see in the figures that this a↵ects dis-
tance values at Receiver 4 and very slightly at Receiver 3.
Since we do not see any increase on distance values of Re-
ceiver 1 and Receiver 2, the system will not create a false
alarm when considering data from all receivers.
At time t = 9.5min, the person walks very close to Re-
ceiver 3, waits next to Receiver 3 for a minute, and then en-
ters Room 1. This a↵ects the distance values of Receiver 3
and Receiver 4. Again, there is no significant change on the
distance values of Receiver 1 and Receiver 2.
At time t = 15.5min, the person walks very close to Re-
ceiver 1, waits next to Receiver 1 for two minutes, then
moves to Receiver 2 at time t = 17.5min and waits next
to Receiver 2 for a minute, and finally enters Room 2. We


















































































Figure 6: Mahalanobis distance in the controlled
movement experiment. Tampering is induced at
t = 21.5min. Distance values at each receiver in-
crease occasionally until this time due to movement.



















































































Figure 7: Earth Mover’s distance in the controlled
movement experiment. Tampering is induced at t =
21.5min. Distance values at each receiver increase
occasionally until this time due to movement.
can see from the figures that distance values increase for
Receiver 3 and Receiver 4 at time t = 15.5min. This is be-
cause the person needs to pass by Receiver 3 and Receiver 4
to go to Receiver 1. Distance values for Receiver 3 and Re-
ceiver 4 go back to normal as distance values for Receiver 1
increase. The system does not create a false alarm when
considering all receivers together as it does not see distance
value increases above the threshold at all receivers at the
same time.
At time t = 21.5min, the person rotates the antenna of
the transmitter 90  clockwise, and enters Room 2. Now
the system creates an alarm, since distance values of all the
receivers increase.
At time t = 24.5min, the person walks very close to Re-
ceiver 1, waits next to Receiver 1 for a minute, and en-
ters Room 2. Distance values of Receiver 1 and Receiver 2
slightly change during this period but remain above the
threshold. Thus, the tamper situation remains. The ex-
periment terminates around time t = 28.5min.
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Figure 8: Tamper decisions (qi) for each individual
receiver in the controlled movement experiment us-
ing Euclidean distance and max(D⌧) as threshold.
False alarms due to movement are present before
the tampering event at t = 21.5min.
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Figure 9: Multi-receiver tamper decisions (Qi) for
the controlled movement experiment. All receivers
are taken into account and max(D⌧) is used as
threshold. False alarms are avoided (FPR = 0) while
the tamper event is correctly identified (For Eu-
clidean and Mahalanobis distance algorithms with
TPR = 1 and for the Earth Mover’s distance algo-
rithm with TPR = 0.94).
Figure 8 shows decisions qi for each receiver (considering
individual receiver results) when using Euclidean distance
algorithm and max(D⌧ ) as the threshold. The x-axis shows
the time in minutes, and y-axis shows the decisions. Decision
0 means there is no tampering, and decision 1 means there
is tampering.
From Figure 8 we can see that false alarms exist when
considering individual receivers. FPRs are 0.08, 0.06, 0.11,
and 0.12 for Receivers 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
However, from Figure 9 we can see that multi-receiver
tamper detection provides the desired results. All the dis-
tance algorithms provide FPR = 0 result. Both Euclidean
and Mahalanobis distance algorithms have a TPR = 1, how-
ever, the Earth Mover’s distance algorithm provides only
TPR = 0.94.
Euclidean, Mahalanobis, and Earth Mover’s distance al-
gorithms perform very similarly. This is somewhat surpris-
ing as they operate quite di↵erently and one would have
expected that more complex distance algorithms capturing
more information would provide better results.
5.2 Uncontrolled Movement
The uncontrolled movement experiment is carried out in
the same environment as the controlled movement exper-












Figure 10: Uncontrolled movement experiment lay-
out. People are moving in the rooms and in the
corridor inducing CSI variations.
Day Night
TimeType TimeType TimeType TimeType
12:00 90  cw 12:10 180  cw 20:00 90  cw 20:10 180  cw
12:20 270  cw 12:30 360 (0 ) cw20:20 270  cw 20:30 360 (0 ) cw
12:40 1 cm up 12:50 1 cm right 20:40 1 cm up 20:50 1 cm right
13:00 1 cm down13:10 1 cm left 21:00 1 cm down21:10 1 cm left
13:20 2 cm up 13:30 2 cm right 21:20 2 cm up 21:30 2 cm right
13:40 2 cm down13:50 2 cm left 21:40 2 cm down21:50 2 cm left
14:00 3 cm up 14:10 3 cm right 22:00 3 cm up 22:10 3 cm right
14:20 3 cm down14:30 3 cm left 22:20 3 cm down22:30 3 cm left
14:40 4 cm up 14:50 4 cm right 22:40 4 cm up 22:50 4 cm right
15:00 4 cm down15:10 4 cm left 23:00 4 cm down23:10 4 cm left
15:20 4 cm up 15:30 5 cm right 23:20 4 cm up 23:30 5 cm right
15:40 5 cm down15:50 5 cm left 23:40 5 cm down23:50 5 cm left
16:00 30 cm left 16:10 60 cm left 00:00 30 cm left 00:10 60 cm left
16:20 Original 00:20 Original
Table 1: The di↵erent tamper events and their
times.
located in di↵erent rooms as shown in Figure 10. People
use the o ces and corridors and may also move chairs and
other objects. Movement events of people and objects may
lead to false tamper detection which we aim to avoid. The
transmitter sends broadcast beacons for tamper detection at
the rate of 1 packet/second.
The experiment starts while the transmitter is in a tam-
pered state. The transmitter antenna is rotated by 90  an-
ticlockwise from its intended position. After a while the
antenna is rotated to its intended position, i.e., it is tran-
sited to the untampered state. In both states (tampered
and untampered) data for threshold selection as described
in Section 4.4) is collected. A history size of ⌧ = 100 CSI
data is also collected during the untampered state when we
can ensure that the environment is free of movement. Then,
the setup is left for a long time in an untampered state.
Then di↵erent tamper states are induced during day time
and later as well at night. The Euclidean distance metric
is used for evaluation. Figure 11 shows this distance value
over time for all 4 receivers.
The experiment starts at 18:00 on 18th of May when the
antenna of the transmitter is rotated 90  anticlockwise from
its intended position. The antenna is rotated to its intended
position at 12:06 on 19th of May. Several tamper situa-
tions are induced from 12:00 until 16:20 on May 20th (see
Table 1 for details). To compare tamper detection in busy
and more quiet periods, the same tamper events are applied
again starting 20:00 on May 20th. Training CSI values are
collected at 01:00 on May 20th (shown as vertical black line
in Figure 11). Maximum distance values within the training
data are also shown in the figure as max(D⌧ ). The distance
values of the packets not received by a receiver are shown as
0 in Figure 11. Tamper events are shown in Figure 11 with















Table 2: FPRs and TPRs when using max(D⌧) as
the threshold.
Tampered state 18:00 18th of May - 12:06 19th of May
Untampered state 12:06 19th of May - 01:00 20th of May
Table 3: Time ranges of tampered and untampered
states for ROC calculation.
Receiver 1 Receiver 2 Receiver 3 Receiver 4
0.032 0.148 0.036 0.258
Table 4: EERs for all the receivers in the uncon-
trolled movement experiment.
5.2.1 Maximum Distance Threshold
Figure 11 shows that distance values are above max(D⌧ )
during o ce hours when there is no tampering. In a busy
environment, max(D⌧ ) is too sensitive and a high FPR is
the consequence. Using max(D⌧ ) as the threshold results in
FPRs and TPRs as shown in Table 2 considering the over-
all decisions Qi. FPR results are divided into three time
regions: (i) Night time between 01:02 and 08:00 when the
experiment environment is less dynamic, (ii) Day time be-
tween 08:00 and 12:00 when the experiment environment is
dynamic, and (ii) Overall (day and night combined). TPR
results are also divided into two time regions: (i) Night
time between 20:00 and 00:30 when the experiment envi-
ronment is less dynamic, (ii) Day time between 12:00 and
16:00 when the experiment environment is dynamic. TPRs
from di↵erent tamper events are averaged resulting in a sin-
gle TPR value (We will analyse TPR of individual tamper
states later). Although we obtain a high TPR for both time
durations and also 0 FPR during night time, we observe a
high FPR during day time. We thus conclude that using
the maximum distance threshold max(D⌧ ) is not suitable
for busy environments.
5.2.2 Equal Error Rate Threshold
The experiment starts while the transmitter is in a tam-
pered state, then it is transited to untampered state after a
while. We can use the distance values from the initial tam-
pered and untampered state to calculate the ROC curve.
The ROC curve can then be used to select a threshold based
on the desired FPR and TPR rates as previously discussed in
Section 4.4. Table 3 shows the time ranges of tampered and
untampered states for ROC calculation. Figure 12 shows
the ROC curve of our 4 di↵erent receivers during this train-
ing time. Thresholds ranging from 0.001 to 1 with 0.001
intervals are applied to the distance values.
We calculate the EER for each receiver. The EER is the
rate where the FPR and FNR are equal. Table 4 shows
the EERs for all the receivers. Figure 13 shows the achiev-
able FPRs and TPRs for the overall decision Qi using this
threshold  EER.
 EER reduces the FPRs dramatically. The FPR during
the day is 0.00024 and it averages 0.00022 over the entire
experiment. Unfortunately, the resulting detection capabil-
Figure 11: Euclidean distance for the uncontrolled movement experiment. Tamper events are indicated with
vertical lines. Distance values of each receiver show tampering and also movement during o ce hours.





















Figure 12: ROC curve of the 4 receivers.













Figure 13: FPRs and TPRs with di↵erent thresh-
olds. FPRs are always 0 during the night time.
max(D⌧) gives high FPRs.  EER reduces both FPRs
and TPRs.  FNR=0 gives more balanced results.
ity of the system is low; TPRs of only 0.148 during night
time and 0.096 during day time are achieved. However, for
some applications it might be acceptable to have such a low
TPR.
5.2.3 Zero False Negative Threshold
If we select a threshold lower than the EER threshold we
may have a chance to increase the TPR. We select the max-
imum threshold where the ROC curve gives a FNR = 0,
 FNR=0. Table 5 shows the all thresholds for each receiver,
and Figure 13 shows the result Qi based on this thresh-
old. This threshold helps to increase TPRs (0.69 during
night and 0.7 during the day), but we also increase the
FPRs (0.045 during day and 0.041 overall). This thresh-
old achieves a good TPR but the FPR is too high for many
practical applications. We apply time-wise filtering to ad-
dress this issue.
5.2.4 Time-Wise Filtering
We use window sizes of tw 2 {10, 30, 60} seconds, and the
decision is made that there is tampering when it was decided
there was tampering for all individual packets within the
window. Figure 14 shows the e↵ect of time-wise filtering
Receiver 1 Receiver 2 Receiver 3 Receiver 4
max(D⌧ ) 0.204 0.406 0.219 0.390
 EER 0.577 0.519 0.500 0.507
 FNR=0 0.419 0.386 0.355 0.396
Table 5: Threshold values for each receiver.
















Figure 14: E↵ect of time-wise filtering on FPRs and
TPRs when using  FNR=0 as the threshold. tw = 60 s
reduces FPRs to 0, but it also reduces TPRs.
















Figure 15: E↵ect of number of receivers to make
a decision on FPRs and TPRs, when using  FNR=0
as the threshold and without using time-wise filter-
ing. Increasing the number of receivers reduces both
FPR and TPR.
over FPRs and TPRs when using  FNR=0 as the threshold.
Increasing tw decreases the FPR. The FPR is reduced from
0.045 to 0 during day time, and it is reduced from 0.04 to
0 overall when tw = 60 s. However, using a 60 s window
reduces the average TPR from 0.69 to 0.58 during night
time, and from 0.7 to 0.53 during day time.
Clearly, it is possible even in a busy environment to use
CSI based tamper detection without risking false alarms
while detecting a reasonable number of tamper situations.
5.2.5 Using Multiple Receivers
Until now, all of the decisions were made by using reports
from all the receivers. All of the receivers needed to receive
the packet, and that packet had to provide a distance above















































































































































































































































































(c) Tamperings during the night time, sorted by TPRs.
Figure 16: TPRs for di↵erent tamper events when
using  FNR=0 as the threshold and without using
time-wise filtering.
receivers should be used and what the contribution is of each
additional receiver to FPRs and TPRs.
We used a total of N = 4 receivers in the experiment.
We can use 1, 2, 3, or all of them to make a tamper de-
cision. Figure 15 shows the tamper decision results when
using  FNR=0 as the threshold and without using time-wise
filtering. Results are averaged for di↵erent combinations of
receivers for a given number of receivers, n. For example, if
we use n = 3 we calculate the results using receivers {1, 2,
3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, and {2, 3, 4} in groups and take the
average.
Figure 15 shows that using an increasing number of re-
ceivers n decreases the FPRs. If we use more than 4 receivers
to make a decision, we might obtain even better FPRs. How-
ever, using more receivers also decreases TPRs.
5.2.6 Tamper Event Detectability
Previously all the TPRs from di↵erent tamper events were
averaged and shown as a single result. In this section, we
analyse individual TPRs for the di↵erent tamper states. We
applied di↵erent tamper events during the day and night.
These tamper events are shown in Table 1.
Figure 16 shows the results when using  FNR=0 as the
threshold and without using time-wise filtering. All the re-
ceivers are used to make a decision. Some receivers could
not receive beacons during the events 2 cm left at night,
4 cm up at night, and 60 cm left at night. These results are
not shown in the figure.
Figure 16a shows TPRs for tamper events in order of their
execution while Figure 16b and Figure 16c show them or-
dered by TPR night and day values. We can see from this
that the magnitude of tampering (moved distance) does not
correlate with detectability. It can also be seen that most
tamper events can clearly be detected while a minority are
hard to detect.
The minimum TPR value during the day time is 0.0034,
the maximum is 1, and the average is 0.704. During the
night time, the minimum TPR value is 0, the maximum is
1, and the average is 0.691.
6. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In the previous sections we have described and analysed
multi-receiver CSI tamper detection. Now we discuss how
these methods can be put to work in practice to secure a
WiFi based IoT setup. We first discuss potential capabilities
of such a system based on the previously shown evaluations.
We then discuss how a practical WiFi based system can
incorporate the described methods and finally we describe
how such a system can be operated in a practical setting.
6.1 System Capability
Many IoT systems are used to monitor and control crit-
ical infrastructure such as airports, refineries, hospitals or
military installations. Additional layers of defence guarding
the installation against tampering and other attacks are de-
sirable. CSI tamper detection is a valuable building block
in this context.
The evaluation has shown that in di↵erent deployment
settings di↵erent FPR and TPR rates are achievable. The
level of tolerable FPR and required TPR depends very much
on the application scenario. The question is: in which ap-
plication scenarios could the described system be employed?
A large number of IoT systems are deployed in areas with
little variation in the environment. For example, systems
are used to monitor and control production processes in re-
fineries or power plants. Workers move throughout these
installations but movement is limited; times of high activity
are often known in advance (e.g. scheduled maintenance).
In these settings a minimal FPR is required (ideally zero)
as false alarms require costly investigation of the situation.
On the other hand a high TPR is required to ensure that
tampering with devices is detected. Our evaluation shows
that requirements of such a setup can be fulfilled.
Other IoT setups are in relatively busy environments. For
example, a wireless camera system used to monitor an o ce
building would experience high levels of movement. In such
a setting a zero FPR can also be achieved but only when
making some sacrifices on the achievable TPR. However,
if CSI tamper detection is used as an additional layer of
defence and not the only security mechanism a TPR below
1 may already bring significant added value to the overall
security of the system.
From our evaluations we conclude that CSI tamper detec-
tion is feasible with (i) perfect FPR (FPR = 0) and perfect
TPR (TPR = 1) in settings with limited movement; and
(ii) perfect FPR (FPR = 0) and good TPR (TPR = 0.53)
in settings with high levels of movement.
6.2 System Design
A system using WiFi enabled nodes would likely operate
in an infrastructure mode. Devices such as cameras would
transmit data via access points interconnected by a fixed
wired backbone. It can be assumed that multiple access
points are in communication range of a device. We therefore
suggest extending the functionality of access points to col-
lect CSI information. The collected CSI information is then
forwarded to a central system which carries out CSI based
tamper detection. To enable CSI collection at multiple ac-
cess points nodes must transmit broadcast frames. This can
be achieved by having nodes transmit periodic beacons for
the purpose of tamper detection (in our experiments a one
second interval was used). Using regular data transmissions
of the nodes is less suitable as 802.11n adjusts the number of
spatial streams and CSI is dependent on the number of spa-
tial streams (see [1]). However, existing beaconing of nodes
can be reused for the purpose of tamper detection. The sys-
tem must allow secure collection of CSI data at access points
which we believe is not trivial but achievable. The full spec-
ification of a CSI collection framework and extension of the
802.11n standard to incorporate appropriate beaconing for
tamper detection is out of scope of this paper. However, we
believe the outlined requirements can be addressed.
6.3 Deployment and Operation
A system using multi-receiver CSI tamper detection re-
quires a training phase when it is deployed. Depending on
the application requirements, di↵erent thresholds might be
used (max(D⌧ ),  EER and  FNR=0) to achieve the desired
FPR and TPR rates. The di↵erent thresholds have di↵erent
complexity in terms of deployment and training.
Using max(D⌧ ) requires a very short training phase. In
our experiments we used 100 packets transmitted over a pe-
riod of 100s. However, during the transmission of these pack-
ets it must be ensured that the system is in an untampered
state and that the environment is quiet.
Using  EER and  FNR=0 requires training data which con-
tains a tampered state. This can be achieved by treating the
initial placement location of a node as a tampered reference
state in which data is collected over a period of time. There-
after the node is placed in its operation location which is the
untampered state. During the tampered and untampered
state training data are collected to calculate the thresholds
as previously described.
We believe that the described setup procedure is feasible
for many application scenarios. For example, when a secu-
rity system is deployed in a restricted area it is possible to
ensure no movement in this area during installation.
Once a system is deployed it may happen that the com-
munication environment changes naturally and the initial
selected thresholds are invalidated. For example, smaller
building alterations would change the observed CSI. These
situations can be identified by an increase in the FPR rate
and a re-initialisation of the system is required. An analysis
of how often such re-calibration is necessary is not included
in this paper and we will address this issue in future work.
7. CONCLUSION
The IoT is used for critical applications and to monitor
and control critical infrastructure. Thus, it is important to
provide secure IoT solutions. In particular it is desirable to
detect tampering with IoT devices. In this paper we have
shown that analysis of 802.11n CSI concurrently at multiple
receivers allows us to provide a reliable tamper detection
mechanism.
Although many IoT devices make use of 802.11n for com-
munication, other transceiver types are also in use. The
proposed methods can directly be applied to other commu-
nication systems based on OFDM. Other systems will de-
scribe the wireless channel di↵erently. However, we believe
that any information describing the communication channel
is useful input for a tamper detection mechanism.
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